One of the purposes of this paper is to explore a number of questions which-to judge from what he assumes–Aristotle might well have asked, but which he apparently did not ask. It is often informative in the history of philosophy to point out the questions which are not raised; it sets those which are raised in a more precise frame.It can be argued that Aristotle implies that it is possible to look like a human being–and indeed be called a human (...) being–without “really” or “fully” being one. Leaving aside the status of females (who for Aristotle are males manques, analogous to the blind or deaf, and of children, we cannot be certain that all adult males of the class whose members look like men “really” are men. (shrink)

Sustained attention, a key cognitive skill that improves during childhood and adolescence, tends to be worse in some emotional and behavioural disorders. Sustained attention is typically studied in non-affective task contexts; here, we used a novel task to index performance in affective versus neutral contexts across adolescence (N = 465; ages 11–18). We asked whether: (i) performance would be worse in negative versus neutral task contexts; (ii) performance would improve with age; (iii) affective interference would be greater in younger adolescents; (...) (iv) adolescents at risk for depression and higher in anxiety would show overall worse performance; and (v) would show differential performance in negative contexts. Results indicated that participants performed more poorly in negative contexts and showed age-related performance improvements. Those at risk of depression performed more poorly than those at lower risk. However, there was no difference between groups as a result of affective context. For anxiety there was no difference in performance as a function of severity. However, those with higher anxiety showed less variance in their reaction times to negative stimuli than those with lower anxiety. One interpretation is that moderate levels of emotional arousal associated with anxiety make individuals less susceptible to the distracting effects of negative stimuli. (shrink)

‘Right reason’. The English words render, somehow or other, the Greek orthos logos, the Latin recta ratio. Not that ratio does much justice to the Greek logos. It limits its scope, or at least would do so if it were not employed in a special “Greek” manner by philosophical users. Indeed all three phrases, Greek, Latin and English are in the nature of counters; none has an obvious and unambiguous sense. There seems to have been a long-standing argument, or at (...) least a disagreement, in antiquity about orthos logos and its role in accounts of the behaviour of the good man, parts of which would repay at least brief discussion, if only to highlight some of the ambiguity I have mentioned. (shrink)

SummaryWe need to classify emotions as objectual and non‐objectual. Some of the objectual emotions are dependent on the characterizations of their objects. So in these cases reason guides the emotions. But there are also other cases in which the conceptual dependency goes the other way. in the case of aesthetic judgments and certain types of judgments involving purpose, or compassion, the ability to make these judgments is dependent on being in certain emotional states. Thus in some cases emotions aid and (...) supplement reason.RésuméNous devons classer les émotions comme objectuelles et non objectuelles. Quelques‐unes des émotions objectuelles sont dépendantes des caractéristiques de leurs objets. La raison guide alors les émotions. Mais il y a aussi des cas ou la dépendance conceptuelle suit ?on;autres voies. Dans le cas de jugements esthétiques et de jugements comportant des buts, ou de la compassion, la capacityé de porter ces jugements est dépendante de certains états émotionnels dans lesquels se trouve le sujet. Ainsi, dans certains cas, les émotions aident et completent la raison.ZusammenfassungWir müssen die Gefühle in objektuelle und nicht‐objektuelle einteilen. Einige der objektuellen Gefühle sind von der Charakterisierung ihrer Objekte abhängig. In diesen Fällen lenkt die Vernunft die Gefühle. Es gibt aber auch Fälle, in welchen die begriffliche Abhängigkeit umgekehrt verläuft. Im Falle von ästhetischen Urteilen und von gewissen Urteilen, die Zwecke oder Mitgefühle betreffen, hängt die Fähigkeit, solche Urteile zu fällen, davon ab, dass man sich in bestimmten Gemütszuständen befindet. So kommt es, dass in einigen Fällen Gefühle die Vernunft unterstützen und ergänzen. (shrink)

L'eschatologie a marqué la théologie chrétienne du XXe siècle. Initiateur en ce domaine, R. Bultmann entreprend une herméneutique « existentiale » et « démythologisante » de la prédication apocalyptique de Jésus, mise en lumière par J. Weiss et A. Schweitzer : en Jésus Dieu prononce la parole définitive qui m'appelle aujourd'hui à la décision de foi et à l'existence authentique. La théologie apprend ainsi à parler de Dieu avec sens en parlant de l'homme. Avec J. Moltmann, le futur est désenclavé (...) du présent où le laissait Bultmann, et l'eschatologie se fait résolument christologique en même temps qu'historique ; mais le passage de la Théologie de l’espérance au Dieu crucifié pose le problème redoutable du lien entre l’horizon de l’espérance et l'histoire abandonnée à la souffrance. Pour J. Moingt, la résurrection, fondement de la christologie, permet de relire la vie de Jésus comme l’histoire de Dieu menant avec les hommes depuis la création le combat eschatologique de la vie contre la mort.La pensée eschatologique s’élabore aussi dans la ligne des théologiens de l'histoire. O. Cullmann fait du Christ le centre de l’histoire du salut, entre un « déjà là » et un « pas encore ». Avec plus d’ambition mais aussi d’ambiguïté, W. Pannenberg situe la résurrection de Jésus, en tant qu’événement historique, au regard de l'histoire universelle dont elle anticipe la fin. La pensée eschatologique ne laisse pas de travailler également d’autres théologies, davantage marquées par les problématiques traditionnelles.Twentieth century Christian theology has been marked by eschatology. R. Bultmann, initiator in this field, underlook an “existential” and “demythologising” hermeneutic of the apocalyptic preaching of Jesus, which had been brought. to light by J. Weiss and A. Schweitzer : in Jesus God pronounces the definitive word that calls me to a decision of faith and authentic existence today. Theology thus learns to speak of God with meaning by speaking of man. With J. Moltmann, the future is freed from present, where Bultmann had left it, and eschatology became resolutely Christological at the same time as historical. But the passage from the Theology of Hope to the Crucified God poses the difficult problem of the connection between the horizon of hope and history left to suffering. For J. Moingt, the resurrection, foundation of Christology, permits a rereading of the life of Jesus as the history of God, who, from the time of creation, leads humanity in the eschatological combat of life against death.Eschatological thought also develops in the direction of theologies of history. O. Cullmann makes Christ the center of the history of salvation, between an “already here” and a “not yet”. With greater ambition but also ambiguity, W Pannenberg places the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event, in comparison with universal history, of which it anticipates the end. Eschatological thought does not fail to also influence others theologies, more marked by traditional problematics. (shrink)

This article argues that Hegel read Lacan. Put less paradoxically, it claims that situating Hegel within a Lacanian paradigm results in an understanding of the future as still open and of history as not ended. Absolute knowing, on this model, is the recognition of the way in which history has developed, not a claim that it can advance no further. The article aims to persuade those who might otherwise dismiss Hegel – for example, persons au courant with poststructuralism – that (...) he still can make a decisive contribution to current debates. (shrink)

BLWith new text and full apparatus criticus The Eudemian Ethics was one of two ethical treatises which Aristotle wrote on the subject of ethica or `matters to do with character'. Although the two works cover much the same ground, the Nicomachean Ethics is better known; the poor manuscript tradition of the Eudemian Ethics has made correct translation and interpretation of the text extremely difficult. The subject of the work is the choice of a certain means of conduct, made by a (...) `man of practical wisdom', between two extremes of behaviour: asceticism and yielding to uncontrolled impulses. Aristotle also stresses the notion of moral intention and the importance of virtue of character. This new Oxford Classical Text of the Eudemian Ethics is the result of many years of work. After Sir David Ross's death, his original text was substantially reworked and revised by his friend and colleague R. R. Walzer, who was aided in the revision by his former pupil Mrs Jean Mingay, who continued his work after his death in 1974. Mrs Mingay was fortunate in being able to make use of previously unpublished contributions from D. J. Allan after his death in the late seventies, and more recently has been helped in her work by the suggestions of Professor D. A. Russell, David Robinson, and Christopher Rowe. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Readymades, Monochromes, Etc.:Nominalism and the Paradox of ModernismJ. M. Bernstein (bio)If Schopenhauer's thesis of art as an image of the world once over bears a kernel of truth, then it does so only insofar as this second world is composed out of elements that have been transposed out of the empirical world in accord with Jewish descriptions of the messianic order as an order just like the habitual order (...) but changed in the slightest degree.—T. W. Adorno, Aesthetic TheoryAdorno's philosophy as a whole, and his aesthetic theory in particular, is irrevocably bound to the tradition and achievements of high modernism. Although Adorno himself did not recognize American Abstract Expression as the apotheosis of high modernism in painting, that judgment now hardly seems contentious.1 And that raises a problem: it is the problem of R. Mutt, again, the problem of the porcelain urinal called Fountain, which was refused admittance to the Society of Independent Artists' Exhibition in April 1917 in spite of the Society's proclaimed democratic slogan "No jury, no prizes"—the work whose life or after-life begins with the beautiful photograph of it by Stieglitz set against the background of Marsden Hartley's The Warriors and that appeared shortly thereafter in the new avant-garde journal The Blind Man. Whatever the immediate repercussions of Fountain, there can be little doubt that much of what is most vital in art in the second half of this century is unthinkable without it; Duchamp's readymade offers an exemplary alternative to the tradition of high modernist painting that has continued to be generative. For a modernist like Adorno, for whom authentic art is that which best rises to the demands and necessities of artistic materials, for whom internal consistency and rigor would appear to be everything, for whom, finally, aesthetic form is the "objective organization within each artwork of what appears as bindingly eloquent" [AT 143; emphasis mine], Duchamp's gesture of simply naming or claiming artistic status for an ordinary bathroom fixture must be anathema. In this respect, Adorno's aesthetic theory would seem to be in the same predicament as Clement Greenberg's modernism: inextricably bound to a tradition that history has left behind. And while the option of refuting the claim of Fountain is certainly possible, and should not be too quickly suppressed (there is something in the claim that will forever be skeptically self-defeating), nonetheless there does appear to be an exemplariness to Fountain that exceeds the narrow provocation of Duchamp's nominalist gesture; something in the readymade, in fact, seems (art historically? aesthetically? conceptually?) irresistible. If so, then modernist [End Page 83] formalism must either find a way of accommodating the readymade without departing from its internal logic or find its claim to our attention forfeited.After laying out the bold outlines of Adorno's formalism, the remainder of this essay will seek to uncover an account of the readymade in the context of what I will eventually call "the paradox of modernism" in order to locate in what way the readymade can be accommodated to a defense of Adorno's late modernism. For the purposes of this argument, I am going to assume that the best overall defense of Duchamp's gesture, which makes it foundational for the understanding of modern art, is that offered by Thierry de Duve in his Kant after Duchamp. My elaboration of Adorno's late modernism will hence proceed, in part, through a charting of some of the fault lines in de Duve's Duchamp. My contention shall be that the generativity of Fountain as readymade not only belongs within modernism, but is only intelligible within a wholly modernist and formalist frame of reference.Adorno's Formalism and the Material MotiveAdorno opens the section of Aesthetic Theory entitled "Coherence and Meaning" with the drastic sounding thesis that "Although artworks are neither conceptual nor judgmental, they are logical" [AT 136]. He continues:In them nothing would be enigmatic if their immanent logicality did not accommodate discursive thought, which criteria they nevertheless regularly disappoint. They most resemble the form of a syllogism and its prototype in empirical thought. That in the temporal... (shrink)

This volume consists of seven contributions to a symposium held in 1970 to commemorate the centennial of Saint John's University. Carlo Giacon and Bernard Cohen explicate the relationship of philosophy and modern science. Joseph Owens and John E. Smith treat the question of God as it is posed in philosophy today. Richard McKeon interrelates humanism, civility, and culture; while Vernon Bourke evaluates humanism as a possible basis for moral philosophy. Finally, Paul Ramsey offers some pithy comments on the present trend (...) which abhors man's irreverence for the non-human environment but waxes enthusiastic over the prospect of man's limitless self-modification. Though these papers are brief, for the most part they are extensively footnoted; and thus they provide a handy survey of current thinking on the indicated issues.--J. M. V. (shrink)

All the essays contained herein, with the exception of the last two—"On Suicide" and "On the Immortality of the Soul"—have appeared in the author's Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary ; the others were published posthumously. In this wide-ranging collection Hume addresses himself to aspects of aesthetics and literary criticism, the philosophy of history, philosophical "types", human nature and belief. The volume conveys a side of Hume too often forgotten in our present admiration of his foreshadowing of analytical philosophy: the man (...) of letters. The editor has provided a useful introduction setting Hume's work in its eighteenth century context.—P. J. M. (shrink)

Drawing upon recent contributions to an already developed literature of diverse speculation on Bayle and his milieu, the author attempts to assess the historical significance of Bayle's writings by means of a chronological treatment of the French Calvinist's changing understanding of the relation of faith and reason. One may find here the main lines of Bayle criticism judiciously set forth, together with a careful investigation of some biographical material and the exposition of Bayle's principal ideas on the role and limits (...) of reason as a speculative and moral guide, the function of grace, the grounds of faith and morality, the problem of error, and, the centrality of Providence. The author argues convincingly for the thesis that Bayle remained consistently loyal to the traditions of the Reform. On the other hand, the closely related attempt to illuminate the logic of Bayle's ambiguous statements of the dualism of reason, as an instrument for yielding clarity and evidence, and as the agent of man's struggle with the unknowable, lacks critical vigor. Nonetheless, this work is a very readable summary of the intellectual contribution of a crucial figure in the evolution of French philosophical and religious thought. A valuable bibliography is included.--J. M. S. (shrink)

Schleiermacher's Copernican revolution in theology is effected through his presentation of the Christian mythos in terms of a phenomenological anthropology of self-consciousness. Moreover, as Niebuhr shows in this apt study of some features of Schleiermacher's theological thinking, the principles which determine the shape of that revolution can be deduced neither from a biblical dogmatics allegedly purified of philosophical presuppositions nor from a philosophy uninformed by theological experience. In the first part of the book, Niebuhr discusses Schleiermacher's little-known work The Christmas (...) Eve: A Dialogue, affording us a picture of the author's starting-point in the experience of a salvation or potentiated self-consciousness which is historically and socially mediated. The subsequent analysis of the lectures on hermeneutics and ethics discloses the object of Schleiermacher's inquiry to be not the supernatural being that posits the cosmos, but the creative Logos indwelling the individual and all men by means of the common, organic media of human existence in which the self both comes to be and comes to create history and culture. Finally, The Christian Faith is reviewed by Niebuhr in terms of the expression it gives to the mature Schleiermacher's theology and christology. The primordial consciousness of being-in-relation reveals the historical, societal, worldly context of the self and the various polarities of the self's existence such that religion emerges as a phenomenon coterminous with man's affective response to the relationships in which the whole of human nature is bound, and theology, the "daughter of religion," becomes the methodology by which the articulation of an affective determination of self-consciousness is achieved. The rigorously pursued explicitation [[sic]] of the forms and determinations of self-consciousness is interpreted by Niebuhr with a penetration and a sympathy at once acute and comprehensive. By giving us a series of insights into Schleiermacher's "thinking in motion," Niebuhr has contributed a cogent testimony to the nineteenth-century theologian's central importance in the fields of hermeneutical theory, philosophical ethics, philosophy of religion and culture, and theology. One would have welcomed a more critical appraisal of Schleiermacher's view of the formal and material compatibility of philosophy and theology, understanding and feeling, inasmuch as the scope of theological inquiry appears to be limited by the boundaries of reason set forth in the ethics, and philosophical anthropology is apparently reduced to a rather sophisticated phenomenology of religious experience. In any case, Niebuhr's scholarly treatment of the material should lead the reader to an informed examination of Schleiermacher's text.--J. M. S. (shrink)

Although Machiavelli was never a military commander, he was throughout much of his life deeply concerned with the conduct of martial affairs; in short, a Renaissance Herman Kahn. This book is an essay on the technique of war: how on army is organized, who make the best soldiers, field manœuvers and battle formations, logistics, internal stability and control of military units, techniques of siege; these are considered both historically with reference to the ancients, as well as the present—the contemporary applications (...) of these techniques in the author's own time. The editor has provided a long critical and historical introduction—amounting to a small monograph in itself—which helps to place Machiavelli's ideas in the tradition of military-political theorists of Western Europe.—P. J. M. (shrink)

In a series of essays, Miss Rand expounds her "Objectivist Ethics." Man will discover, if he is sufficiently rational, those goals and values which are peculiar to him alone, i.e., those which will enable him to survive, and which require complex thought processes. The result of this search is that the moral man is he who achieves his maximum happiness; relationships, whether economic or emotional, are to be based on trade, and no interests conflict if they are viewed in a (...) properly wide context. The essays are quite readable, although not so arresting as Miss Rand's novels; however, the ethics collapses when it is applied to a populous society whose environment is either agriculturally poor or highly mechanized. Given these conditions, if a man views his interest from the limited standpoint of Objectivism, there is a necessary conflict of interests.—J. M. B. (shrink)

Drawing upon recent contributions to an already developed literature of diverse speculation on Bayle and his milieu, the author attempts to assess the historical significance of Bayle's writings by means of a chronological treatment of the French Calvinist's changing understanding of the relation of faith and reason. One may find here the main lines of Bayle criticism judiciously set forth, together with a careful investigation of some biographical material and the exposition of Bayle's principal ideas on the role and limits (...) of reason as a speculative and moral guide, the function of grace, the grounds of faith and morality, the problem of error, and, the centrality of Providence. The author argues convincingly for the thesis that Bayle remained consistently loyal to the traditions of the Reform. On the other hand, the closely related attempt to illuminate the logic of Bayle's ambiguous statements of the dualism of reason, as an instrument for yielding clarity and evidence, and as the agent of man's struggle with the unknowable, lacks critical vigor. Nonetheless, this work is a very readable summary of the intellectual contribution of a crucial figure in the evolution of French philosophical and religious thought. A valuable bibliography is included.--J. M. S. (shrink)

Although Machiavelli was never a military commander, he was throughout much of his life deeply concerned with the conduct of martial affairs; in short, a Renaissance Herman Kahn. This book is an essay on the technique of war: how on army is organized, who make the best soldiers, field manœuvers and battle formations, logistics, internal stability and control of military units, techniques of siege; these are considered both historically with reference to the ancients, as well as the present—the contemporary applications (...) of these techniques in the author's own time. The editor has provided a long critical and historical introduction—amounting to a small monograph in itself—which helps to place Machiavelli's ideas in the tradition of military-political theorists of Western Europe.—P. J. M. (shrink)

Essays on Gilbert, Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, Harvey, van Helmont, and Descartes attempt, at a medium level of complexity, to relate the positions of these men to twentieth century views of the same questions. The stated purpose of the book is the assessment of the role of each man in the "methodological revolution"; although the methods are discussed, little attempt is made to put them into the context necessary for the reader to view them as revolutionary.—J. M. B.

The author regards faith as a restless quest for that which can save man from his self-destructive tendencies and allow him to actualize most completely his constructive potentialities. Wieman critically examines several answers to this quest of faith, including those of Dewey, Tillich, and Barth. In contrast he develops the view of "liberal religion," which finds the answer in a divine creativity fostered by communication, and is productive of fresh insights which transform human ideals.--J. M. W.

Schleiermacher's Copernican revolution in theology is effected through his presentation of the Christian mythos in terms of a phenomenological anthropology of self-consciousness. Moreover, as Niebuhr shows in this apt study of some features of Schleiermacher's theological thinking, the principles which determine the shape of that revolution can be deduced neither from a biblical dogmatics allegedly purified of philosophical presuppositions nor from a philosophy uninformed by theological experience. In the first part of the book, Niebuhr discusses Schleiermacher's little-known work The Christmas (...) Eve: A Dialogue, affording us a picture of the author's starting-point in the experience of a salvation or potentiated self-consciousness which is historically and socially mediated. The subsequent analysis of the lectures on hermeneutics and ethics discloses the object of Schleiermacher's inquiry to be not the supernatural being that posits the cosmos, but the creative Logos indwelling the individual and all men by means of the common, organic media of human existence in which the self both comes to be and comes to create history and culture. Finally, The Christian Faith is reviewed by Niebuhr in terms of the expression it gives to the mature Schleiermacher's theology and christology. The primordial consciousness of being-in-relation reveals the historical, societal, worldly context of the self and the various polarities of the self's existence such that religion emerges as a phenomenon coterminous with man's affective response to the relationships in which the whole of human nature is bound, and theology, the "daughter of religion," becomes the methodology by which the articulation of an affective determination of self-consciousness is achieved. The rigorously pursued explicitation [[sic]] of the forms and determinations of self-consciousness is interpreted by Niebuhr with a penetration and a sympathy at once acute and comprehensive. By giving us a series of insights into Schleiermacher's "thinking in motion," Niebuhr has contributed a cogent testimony to the nineteenth-century theologian's central importance in the fields of hermeneutical theory, philosophical ethics, philosophy of religion and culture, and theology. One would have welcomed a more critical appraisal of Schleiermacher's view of the formal and material compatibility of philosophy and theology, understanding and feeling, inasmuch as the scope of theological inquiry appears to be limited by the boundaries of reason set forth in the ethics, and philosophical anthropology is apparently reduced to a rather sophisticated phenomenology of religious experience. In any case, Niebuhr's scholarly treatment of the material should lead the reader to an informed examination of Schleiermacher's text.--J. M. S. (shrink)

In a series of essays, Miss Rand expounds her "Objectivist Ethics." Man will discover, if he is sufficiently rational, those goals and values which are peculiar to him alone, i.e., those which will enable him to survive, and which require complex thought processes. The result of this search is that the moral man is he who achieves his maximum happiness; relationships, whether economic or emotional, are to be based on trade, and no interests conflict if they are viewed in a (...) properly wide context. The essays are quite readable, although not so arresting as Miss Rand's novels; however, the ethics collapses when it is applied to a populous society whose environment is either agriculturally poor or highly mechanized. Given these conditions, if a man views his interest from the limited standpoint of Objectivism, there is a necessary conflict of interests.—J. M. B. (shrink)

Annotation. Against the background of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Bradley provides a detailed differentiation between Aristotle's and Aquinas's view on moral principles and the end of man.

The paper offers a counter- reading to Derrida's “utopian” reading of Nietzsche, focussing instead on Nietzsche's cynical view of friendship, based on the impossibility of being a friend to oneself. Unlike Aristotle, who sees the basis of human political nature in their shared rationality and mutual friendship, Nietzsche sees not only politics, but human beings themselves as being constituted by a violent act of submission, and characterised by an ongoing struggle for power. The paper further examines two intellectual traditions about (...) friendship and politics, one according to which the two are positively related and no real tension could exist between them. Another tradition holds friendship to be irreconcilable with politics. Elements of both traditions can be recognised in Nietzsche who, finding the radical deceptive nature of friendship unacceptable, moves to a solitude which is equally unbearable. For it is precisely the hermit that knows that his solitude makes him into an other to himself, which turns out to be a motive for real friendship, the third element which prevents the lonely hermit from sinking into the depth of self- interrogation. The paper concludes with the recognition that friendship, for Nietzsche, can only have an intermediary function on the way to full realisation of friendship, which will be a friendship of an inner difference or plurality, i.e. on our way to what is ultimately beyond the human condition, to the “over man”. (shrink)

Morality, as commonly conceived, is a delusion; it is, however, indispensable for the flourishing both of society and of individuals. These are the main theses, one concerning the status, the other the content of morality,, of J. L. Mackie’s Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong. In part 1, with much fresh, useful, if subsidiary discussion of more standard meta-ethical fare—meanings of normative terms and analysis of moral argument—Mackie argues that the morality of the plain man is not, what it is commonly (...) taken to be, revelatory of a realm of objective values. Such values, he contends, making no secret of his empiricism, are ontologically too queer to exist, epistemologically too alien to be known. Nor are they needed to account for the specious objectivity of common sense morality, for there are "patterns of objectification" which, with less philosophical extravagance, can explain how an agent’s subjective attitudes become objectified. Although Mackie does think that one’s moral principles are prescriptive, universal, and, in some sense, chosen, his skepticism is not the fruit of linguistic analysis. On the contrary. "[O]rdinary moral judgments include a claim to objectivity.... Any analysis of the meanings of moral terms which omits this claim to objective, intrinsic, prescriptivity is to that extent incomplete; and this is true of any non-cognitive analysis, any naturalist one, and any combination of the two". (shrink)

The innovative field of Regenerative Medicine (RM) is expected to extend the possibilities of prevention or early treatment in healthcare. Increasingly, clinical trials will be developed for people at risk of disease to investigate these RM interventions. These individuals at risk are characterised by their susceptibility for developing clinically manifest disease in future due to the existence of degenerative abnormalities. So far, there has been little debate about the ethical appropriateness of including such individuals at risk in clinical trials. We (...) discuss three main challenges of selecting this participant model for testing RM interventions: the challenge of achieving a proportional risk–benefit balance; complexities in the trial design in terms of follow-up and sample size; and the difficulty of obtaining informed consent due to the many uncertainties. We conclude that selecting the model is not ethically justifiable for first-in-man trials with RM interventions due to the high risks and uncertainties. However, the model can be ethically appropriate for testing the efficacy of RM interventions under the following conditions: interventions should be low risk; the degenerative abnormalities (and other risk factors) should be strongly related with disease within a short time frame; robust preclinical evidence of efficacy needs to be present; and the informed consent procedure should contain extra safeguards with regard to communication on uncertainties. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 6, June 2022.

Misattributed paternity or ‘false’ paternity is when a man is wrongly thought, by himself and possibly by others, to be the biological father of a child. Nowadays, because of the progression of genetics and genomics the possibility of finding misattributed paternity during familial genetic testing has increased. In contrast to other medical information, which pertains primarily to individuals, information obtained by genetic testing and/or pedigree analysis necessarily has implications for other biologically related members in the family. Disclosing or not a (...) misattributed paternity has a number of different biological and social consequences for the people involved. Such an issue presents important ethical and deontological challenges. The debate centres on whether or not to inform the family and, particularly, whom in the family, about the possibility that misattributed paternity might be discovered incidentally, and whether or not it is the duty of the healthcare professional to disclose the results and to whom. In this paper, we consider the different perspectives and reported problems, and analyse their cultural, ethical and legal dimensions. We compare the position of HCPs from an Italian and British point of view, particularly their role in genetic counselling. We discuss whether the Oviedo Convention of the Council of Europe can be seen as a basis for enriching the debate. (shrink)